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Langer and Hofstadter on Painting
and Language: A Critique

Curtis L. Carter
Philosophy Department, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

This essay is addressed to those concerned with the application
of linguistic models or analogies to paintings.1 It contends that
linguistic models are applicable to the analysis of styles of painting.
Accordingly, it rejects the view of those who oppose the use of a
linguistic model or analogy for the analysis of paintings. However,
rather than to apply the linguistic model directly to paintings as such, I
propose the examination of styles of painting as language-like
systems. The main task of the paper is to analyze and show the limits
of certain obstacles to application of a linguistic model or analogy to
paintings. By showing that certain obstacles posed by Hofstadter and
Langer are insufficiently supported, I will attempt to clear the way for
a viable application of the linguistic model to paintings.
There is interest in the question of painting as language on the
part of artists, art historians, and some philosophers. The discussions
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by painters stress the importance of finding the rules or laws of
"picture language." Poussin, in the seventeenth century; Seurat, in the
nineteenth century; and Kandinsky, Mondrian, and others in the
twentieth century have approached the question of the language of
painting through compositional factors.2 Representative of these is
Kandinsky's Concerning the Spiritual in Art, an essay in "pictorial
grammar." The grammar is in terms of form and color based on
analogies with music and language.
These discussions of "the language of painting" by painters
suffer from certain difficulties. They try to develop a language for all
paintings. My own investigation suggests that the search for a
universal language-like system for all paintings tries to cover too wide
a range. The resulting system would be open to objection for its
endless multiplicity of rules and elements and for its failure to take
account of the diversity found among style groupings. Also, the
discussions of painting as language by artists do not distinguish clearly
between syntactic and semantic aspects of painting.
Certain art historians have shown interest in the notion of
painting as language. Wölfflin introduces two sets of polar categories:
linear and painterly, plane and recession, closed and open form,
multiplicity and unity, and absolute clarity versus relative clarity of the
subject.3 The first of each of these pairs together form a set of criteria
for Classical (Renaissance) style. The second of the pairs together
comprise a set of criteria for anti-Classical style. Wölfflin views each of
these as the basis of two distinct systems of visual representation
which are like two languages. Shapiro also alludes to the notion of
styles being like languages consisting of expressive systems.4
Ackerman attributes to styles language-like features such as
vocabulary and syntax.5 However, none of these art historians develop
the notion of painting as language beyond general suggestions that
paintings are language-like.
Philosophers too have given attention to the question of painting
as language. Charles Morris in his application of the theory of signs to
aesthetics argues that the semiotic terms syntax, semantics, and
pragmatics are applicable to paintings.6 However, Morris does not go
on to show in what sense paintings have these features.
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Briefly, I hold that within the limits of analogy a linguistic model
is applicable to styles of painting.7 If styles are the "languages" of
painting, we must attempt to demarcate the notion of a style. This
cannot be done by forcing the linguistic analogy too closely. Instead, it
must be done by working out independent criteria for distinguishing
one style from another. Thus the linguistic model is not taken over
literally in terms of words, sentences, subjects, predicates, etc.
Rather, the analogy serves to elucidate the grammar-like elements
and rules of the languages of styles. Furthermore, the "grammar" of a
style of painting is a normative grammar which tells how the elements
of paintings in the style are to be arranged and used. Its rules may be
broken without resulting necessarily in a "nonpainting" (as a broken
rule of syntax may result in a "non-sentence"). Rather, the result of
breaking an important rule of a "language" of style is a painting which
either fails to be representative of that style, or is recognizably
incorrect in that style.
What are the elements of such a grammar of style? By analogy
to language these are the concepts of syntactic (formal) and semantic
(referential or representational) aspects of works in a style. Syntax is
the notion of formal arrangement of the pictorial-visual elements,
particularly shapes, according to rule but in terms of non-semantic
considerations. Semantics is concerned with the relations of paintings
or their shapes in a style to the objects, events, etc., which they
represent or exemplify. Both function through their respective ways of
manipulating the pictorial-visual-elements-line, color, value, texture,
and especially shape. A shape in the broadest sense is any bounded
area on the picture plane which is defined by linear boundaries; or by
differences in color, value, texture, or by any combination of these.
Shapes function in both syntactic and semantic roles in this analysis.
On the level of syntactic analysis shapes are the primitive elements
out of which the more complex units (paintings) are constructed. In
semantic analysis, these shapes may be assigned representational or
other semantic functions. But as syntactic elements they do not yet
have semantic import.
In order to sustain the application of a linguistic model or
analogy to painting, it is necessary to examine objections to this use of
a linguistic model. The obstacles that I will consider arise very clearly
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in the writings of Hofstadter8 and Langer.9 Hofstadter's and Langer's
objections are analyzed as the major opposition because they are
representative, well formulated, and deal directly with crucial syntactic
and semantic issues. Their arguments also reflect some of the
important misconceptions which this essay seeks to clarify concerning
the analysis of paintings in terms of a linguistic model. One of these is
the contention that semiotic or significance theories, those which
approach styles of paintings as sign schema, reduce either the
meaning (Hofstadter) or the function (Langer) of paintings to
referential meaning or function. In each case, the referential emphasis
is said to miss or neglect what is central in the meaning and function
of paintings. The other chief obstacle is the contention that paintings
belong to another kind of schema than those to which semiotic
concepts apply. Langer contends that the two kinds of schema differ in
their manner of presenting information and that paintings lack
vocabulary and syntax. Both are essential features of schema to which
semiotic analysis applies.
I shall contend that the arguments offered in support of these
proposed obstacles fail to sustain the notion that a linguistic model or
analogy is inapplicable to paintings.

A. Hofstadter's Objections
I understand Hofstadter's main objection to be that significance
theories fail to do justice to the meanings of paintings because they
regard meaning as being "referential." In his comments on Beardsley's
analysis of significance theories of art,10 Hofstadter suggests that
Beardsley's choice of significance to deal with the meaning of works of
art reduces artistic meaning to "the abstract idea of referring." This is
objectionable to Hofstadter because it reduces artistic meaning to what
is common to it and non-artistic meaning, which is tantamount to
having left the art out of the meaning.11 Hofstadter's own view
incorporates the notion that artistic meaning includes the articulation
of "a concrete spiritual attitude-containing elements of feeling,
cognition, and conation."12
There are really two arguments in Hofstadter's objection, which
can be dealt with separately: 1) that significance theories reduce
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artistic meaning to mere reference; 2) that significance theories will
see in a painting only what it has in common with non-artistic
meaning. The weight of Hofstadter's first argument is based upon the
questionable assumption that reference in these theories exhausts the
"meaning" of a painting. What is overlooked in his view is that a
referential analysis of meaning in a painting does not immediately
preclude manifestations of artistic or aesthetic significance for the
same painting. For Hofstadter to substantiate his claim that
significance theories reduce artistic meaning to reference he would
have to show that the analysis in terms of one-reference-necessarily
excludes the other-artistic, aesthetic-as non-referential features. Or he
would need to show that for significance theories the artistic or
aesthetic is understood in terms of reference. Hofstadter has not
shown that either of these situations exists.
Aside from the fact that referential or representational
"meanings" do not necessarily exhaust the analysis of a painting's
meaning, I doubt that there is anything in Hofstadter's notion of
artistic meaning-described as "concrete spiritual attitude containing
elements of feeling, cognition, and conation"-which differs
substantially from acceptable denotata of the term representation. For
representation when applied to paintings is used not only to designate
references to nature in the objective world but includes references to
thoughts and emotions. This extension of reference in art is noted in
the remarks of an earlier writer on the philosophy of art:
As thoughts and emotions cannot be heard or seen in
themselves, they cannot be presented or communicated to our
fellow citizens directly.... They must be represented indirectly;
i.e., through the use of a medium differing from themselves in
that it can be heard and seen. This medium the mind must find
in material nature, the sounds and sights of which it can accept,
imitate, modify and develop...13
There seems to be nothing in Hofstadter's first argument which
is not covered either by the counter-assertion that representation in
the narrower sense is only one aspect of the meaning of the painting,
or by extending representation to include, as it rightly does in
paintings, reference to concepts and to feelings as well as to nature in
the external world. Either of the above two equally feasible approaches
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would render Hofstadter's argument ineffective as a viable support for
his objection to a significance theory analysis of paintings. Neither
alternative is incongruous with the analysis of styles of painting as
language-like systems.
Hofstadter's second argument is that significance theories have
the unfortunate consequence of causing one to see in a painting only
what it has in common with non-artistic meaning. Contrary to
Hofstadter, I suggest that the representational analysis of meaning in
significance theories does not abandon discrimination among
references made by a noun, a statement in theoretical physics, and a
painting. Between references executed in languages and those in
paintings there are important differences of purpose and of means.
A representation in a language through the use of a noun is
often used simply to designate or to classify. A reference in the form of
a statement in theoretical physics functioning as part of a description
accommodates the needs of an operational model for accounting for
the orderly behavior of some natural phenomena. However, a
representation in a painting is hardly ever used simply to designate, to
classify, or to present scientific description, but rather, it selects,
emphasizes, arranges, and presents its subject for aesthetic attention
and enjoyment. While all of these-the noun, the scientific statement,
and the painting-are engaged in the common task of referring to
something beyond themselves, there is not the absence of
discrimination and the reduction of artistic meaning to the abstract
idea of referring as proposed by Hofstadter.
Between references made in languages and in paintings there
are also important differences of means. Although inscriptions in
languages exhibit pictorial qualities such as color, line, value, and
texture, these pictorial qualities are rarely the means of representation
for the languages. The syntax of a language ordinarily contains no
instructions for uses of the pictorial properties. By contrast, the syntax
of a style of painting does indicate how color and line are to function in
the style. And on the semantic level, line and color, together with the
other pictorial elements, comprise the shapes which are the dominant
vehicles of representation in paintings. Accordingly, hue, saturation,
thickness of line, and other properties of color important in a painting
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have not the same bearing on syntactic and semantic functions of
written languages.
This is not to overlook the fact that color and other pictorial
elements may affect responses to language elements in certain special
instances. For example, experimental studies show that the time of
response to a color word blue is altered when it is printed in red ink.14
Other possible exceptions are gimmick printing, calligraphy, and
lettering or typography used to represent in a painting sense by
characteristics of shape, line, or color. However, in these instances the
written language is affected by or viewed from the point of view of
syntactic and semantic rules more like that of painting than of
discursive written language.
Thus, we see that endowing special cases of linguistic signs with
pictorial elements does not contradict the assertion that color
functioning in a style performs in quite a different way in a language
scheme. For syntactic and semantic purposes a sentence reads just as
well in one color as another or with thin or thick lines, as long as there
remains sufficient contrast to discern the words and their order. But in
the case of paintings, pictorial elements such as color and line,
operating through the pictorial scheme, are a part of the vehicle of
representation. Hue, saturation, brightness in color, thickness,
direction, and movement of lines make up the vocabulary of shapes
through which the painting refers to something beyond itself. In a
painting, reference depends upon the visual elements acting in their
assigned roles in a style.15
The outcome of this discussion of reference in painting and in
languages is that Hofstadter's conclusion that significance theories,
when applied to works of art, result in the reducing of artistic meaning
to what it shares with non-artistic representation is unwarranted.
Differences in purposes and means in the types of linguistic references
cited and representation in painting, as noted above, prevent
Hofstadter's contention from materializing.
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B. Langer's Objections
Langer's objections to the analysis of styles of painting as
language-like systems, first, similar to the argument of Hofstadter,
purport to show that preoccupation with the referential function of
paintings leads to neglect of their more basic function which is the
"formulation of experience," and, second, argue that there exist two
radically different kinds of schema, discursive and presentational,
which unalterably separate written languages (discursive) and
paintings (presentational).

1. Representation
Langer's dissatisfaction with the application of representation to
painting is apparent in her book, Problems of Art. Semanticists'
preoccupation with reference as a defining property of symbols, she
charges, has led to a neglect of the more primitive role of formulating
experience "as something imaginable in the first place." This neglect
causes some to attribute mistakenly referential function to art symbols
as well as to others. Langer proposes that art symbols are symbols
only in a special sense which enables them to perform the formulative
but not the referential function. Paintings make only direct
presentations of experience. As expressive forms, paintings present
the form of a feeling in their structures, but they do not denote by
pointing to something beyond their presence. They express the form of
a feeling by presenting "the fabric of sensibility, emotion, and the
strains of more concentrated cerebrations, for our impersonal
cognition."16
I suggest, contrary to Langer, that the formulative and the
referential functions in a painting are not mutually exclusive. A
painting may do both. There is a distinction between the act of
formulating and the end product of formulation. The act of formulating
as illustrated in the making of a painting is the transformation of
perceptions, thoughts, feelings into cognitively regulated pictorial
elements which present the original events for "contemplation, logical
intuition, recognition, understanding."17 In its efforts to call attention
to the "formative-presentational" role of paintings as symbols,
however, Langer's analysis dismisses too quickly the representational.
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Just as a painting is able to "formulate" the primitive feelings and
perceptions from which it arose, it also refers back to the same, thus
exercising both presentational and referential properties of symbols.
Paintings in many styles also refer outside themselves to persons,
objects, or events which they are said to depict. Paintings or their
shapes in both of these instances function representationally. Thus, we
need not deny the relevance of representation to an analysis of
paintings in their role as signs in order to see that a painting may do
other things, such as formulate experience. The formulative and
referential functions of paintings are not mutually exclusive.

2. Presentational and Discursive Signs
Langer's objections to the use of a linguistic model for analyzing
painting arise largely from a proposed distinction between
presentational and discursive signs. I understand this distinction to be
a differentiation between the schemata of signs and symbols to which
semiotic-linguistic concepts apply (discursive-lingistic signs) and
schemata to which they do not apply (presentational-art symbol).18 It
is interesting to note how Langer is led to the distinction between
presentational and discursive schema. Her own account of this in
Philosophy in a New Key suggests that the distinction arises out of a
desire to free cognitive activity from a limit which follows from the
post-Wittgensteinian, post-Carnapian analysis of language. The
essence of this limit is that language, including mathematical and
scientific signs, plus linguistic approximations in gesture,
hieroglyphics, and graphs, is the only means of articulating thought.
This is accompanied by the corollary that any aspect of experience
which cannot be articulated in a discursive language (Langer's sense)
is to be regarded as feelings. In accordance with this distinction, the
structures in which feelings are objectified are treated as expressions
of emotion, feeling, or wish.19
Langer's desire to make a place in cognitive activity for other
kinds of semiotic activity, especially that of works of art, prompts her
sharp distinction between discursive schema and presentational
schema. In the class of discursive schema she places language in the
sense indicated above. In the class or presentational signs she
includes works of art such as paintings. Her plan was to accept the
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prescriptions of the post-Wittgensteinian, post-Carnapian analysis of
language, but not to stop where it does. Langer sees in art symbols an
unexplored area of semantic which goes beyond that already explored
in connection with discursive languages. Previous analysis by Carnap
and others has failed to comprehend the important distinction between
simple cries of "oh" and the articulateness of symbols in the arts. She
asserts that art symbols are genuine symbol forms but not those
investigated previously by logicians.20
Having argued for the extension of symbolic activity to include
works of art, Langer then proceeds to distinguish art symbols from
discursive language symbols. Consider her remarks concerning
painting. Visual form lines, colors, and other pictorial elements are just
as capable of becoming symbols as are words. However, languages as
discursive sign systems are a special sort which preclude generalizing
from them to paintings. The discursive features of language which
separate it from paintings are then enumerated.
1. Languages have vocabulary and syntax including word
elements with fixed meanings which can be used in
connection with rules of syntax to make composite symbols
with new meanings.
2. Word equivalencies in a language permit expression of the
same meaning in various forms and also permit the
construction of a dictionary.
3. Language systems permit translation of propositions and
substitution of words without changes in meaning.21
In contrast to languages, pictures, including paintings, lack
elements with independent meanings, and their shapes are arranged
in "quite indescribable combinations." 22 Because paintings do not
possess the salient characteristics of discursive signs enumerated
above, Langer concludes that paintings are non-discursive.
Structurally, this means that paintings do not have vocabulary or
syntax. This structural distinction is in addition to the previously noted
functional distinction in which Langer claims that signs in discursive
systems may represent or denote but signs in painting schemes do
not.
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I am in full agreement with Langer's desire to recognize the
status of works of art as forms of cognitive activity along with
languages and other sign schemes. My chief quarrel with her arises
from her radical separation of works of art from languages by means
of the proposed distinction between presentational and discursive
schema. My contention is that neither her arguments for this
distinction nor a comparison of the two kinds of schemata, particularly
cases of paintings and written languages, will support this strong
distinction.

3. Sequentially versus Simultaneously Perceivable
Structures
In order to support her distinction between presentational and
discursive signs, Langer introduces the notion that discursive signs
present their information in sequential order, while presentational
signs offer theirs simultaneously. A possible interpretation of Langer's
notion is the following: The viewer of the painting has the entire work
in front of him and is able to read the signs in the painting
simultaneously; however, the reader of the novel can only experience
the written signs sequentially in a connected series which is regularly
interrupted by the turning of pages. But a message in a written
language need not be more than a page long to be of significance.
Paragraphs or poems frequently do not exceed the length of a page;
sentences almost never do. I presume, however, that Langer is
making a more consequential claim, either about the way in which
elements in a string of written words and elements of a paintings are
arranged, or about the manner in which the respective orders are
perceived. Possibly she intends to apply the sequential-simultaneous
distinction to both. But I will argue that it applies to neither.
I understand sequence as it applies to word inscriptions and to
paintings to be the arrangement of visual-cognitive cues which
establishes continuity for a perceiver among the parts of the string of
words or among the elements of a painting. Sequential order is visual
in the sense that it is presented in a medium that is capable of being
perceived through the eyes. Sequential order is cognitive in the sense
that it entails the arrangement of these elements in human behavioral
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acts that are directed toward ordering the thought-experiences to
which these elements are related.
Applied to strings of phonemes or words which are "well
formed" according to the rules of a language and which have meaning
with respect to the semantic relations of the language, sequential as
Langer uses it refers to the essentially one-dimensional arrangement
of the string of words. In written English it is customary to place the
words in a sequence from left to right on a surface. Thus far we have
established a plausible interpretation of sequential as it applies to
strings of words, the example of discursive signs.
Does this definition of sequential order apply to the
arrangement of shapes in paintings? In some styles there are
approximations of sequential composition, e.g., Eugene Delacroix's
The Arab Tax, Joseph Turner's Keelmen Heaving Coals by Moon Light,
and Paul Cezanne's Mont Sainte-Victoire, 1904-6.23 In planning and
executing a painting the artist, in many styles, carefully divides the
canvas into areas of relatively proportioned size according to
mathematically determined formulas. He then uses these divisions of
the canvas to determine the basis for the distribution of color, value,
and shapes.24 Division of the canvas in itself is not a sequential order,
but it suggests a basis for one. It enables the artist to plan his
composition so as to "lead the viewer's eye" through a sequence of
important points in the painting based on the distribution of shapes.
There are several means of developing sequential composition.
Dominance and subordinance among shapes in a composition is one. A
painter may indicate dominant shapes by size variation, brighter color,
greater complexity of structure, etc. Systematic gradations in sizes of
shapes may also act as a basis for sequential composition. Delacroix's
use of bright colors for dominant shapes, together with gradations in
shape sizes, sets up a kind of sequential order among the shapes in
The Arab Tax, illustrating both of these principles. The use of a scaled
palette on which the artist arranges the colors into orders based upon
systematic gradation of hue, saturation, and brightness is another
means of sequential composition. The artist follows the arrangement of
pigment gradations on the set palette in order to "lead the eye" in
accordance with the sequences of color gradation. Turner in Keelmen
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Heaving Coals by Moon Light and Cezanne in Mont Sainte-Victorie,
1904-6, reflecting the use of a scaled palette, establish a sense of
sequential composition based on color gradation. Dominance and the
other principles need not always result in sequential arrangement, but
these examples suggest they may do so.25
Before leaving the issue of sequential order we will consider the
relevance of the sequential-simultaneous distinction to the perception
of strings of words and paintings. Sequential perceiving I will define in
terms of the evidence from studies of eye movements.26 I will regard
as symptomatic of sequentially initiated perception eye movements
that follow, element by element, the order set forth in the
arrangement of a string of words or a painting. Similarly, I will regard
as symptomatic of simultaneously initiated perception a situation in
which all the elements of the visible string of words or all of the
elements of the painting are grasped at the same time.
Studies of eye movements of subjects reading or viewing
paintings do not confirm either strictly sequential movements of the
eye in reading words or all-encompassing "eye-gulps" in viewing
paintings. Buswell's study of how people view paintings, which is
based on photographing and charting eye movements of subjects
looking at paintings, reports some interesting information pertinent to
the sequence-simultaneous distinction. Buswell reports, "in looking at
pictures just as in the process of reading, the eye moves in a series of
quick jerks and pauses." 27 He notes that the directions of eye
movements in viewing a painting do not follow the general pattern of
the design by moving from motif to motif. There is evidence, however,
for two general patterns in eye movements:
One of these consists of a general survey in which the eye
moves with a series of relatively short pauses over the main
portions of the picture. A second type of pattern was observed
in which series of fixations, usually longer in duration, are
concentrated over small areas of the picture, evidencing detailed
examination of those sections.28
If we may assume that eye movements are objective symptoms of the
perceptual processes, as Buswell does, then Langer's distinction
between discursive and presentation signs is not supported. Neither of
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these reported patterns of eye movements during the viewing of
paintings suggests anything like simultaneous apprehension of the
information in the painting. The evidence points instead to a much
closer similarity of pattern between the eye movements observed in
reading and in viewing paintings than expected.
E. H. Gombrich comes to a similar conclusion concerning the
inadequacy of the sequence simultaneous distinction in perceiving
written words and paintings. Gombrich writes:
We believe that we take the picture more or less at one glance
and recognize the motif. Our experience with Escher's
contradition shows that this account is inadequate. We read a
picture as we read a printed line, by picking up letters or cues
and fitting them together.29
It is thus conceivable that eye movements in both activities follow
centers of interest and organize information by linking together the
various centers of interest into a coherent view. In paintings the areas
of interest consist of concentrations of lines, special color areas, and
shapes. In prose writing corresponding area of interest are key words
spread over the page.
Therefore, the argument that languages present information
sequentially and that paintings present information simultaneously is
contradicted by evidence that both may have similar methods for the
arrangement and the perception of their elements.

4. The Argument That Paintings Lack Vocabulary
Returning now to Langer's proposed structural distinctions
between discursive and presentational symbolic systems, let us
consider her argument that paintings lack vocabulary. The first task is
to clarify what is meant by vocabulary. Langer's explanation of
linguistic vocabulary shows it consisting of a stock of words with fixed
meanings, which have equivalents from which a dictionary of
meanings may be composed. Also, the vocabulary elements in a
language may be equivalent to other single units or combinations of
elements into which they are translatable. Paintings, it is argued, do
not possess vocabulary because they cannot be broken down into
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol 32, No. 3 (Spring 1974): pg. 331-342. DOI. This article is © Wiley and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

14

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

elements like words. Lines, areas of light and shade, color patches "do
not represent, item for item, those elements which have names; there
is not one blotch for the nose, one for the mouth, etc." 30
One difficulty I find with Langer's comparison of vocabulary in
language and in painting is that nowhere is it established what should
be the units of comparison. Shall we compare words with lines, areas
of light and shade, color patches? Or shall we compare letter
characters with lines and color patches and leave completed words for
comparison with completed paintings? Langer does not clearly
delineate the appropriate units of comparison. She seems to assume
that the question of vocabulary is to be settled by comparing the
function of words with that of lines, areas of light and shade, and color
patches. Perhaps this formulation prejudices the case too heavily
against the possibility of paintings having vocabulary.
The arguments offered by Langer to show that the vocabulary
elements of languages have fixed meanings, that some words are
equivalent to combinations of other words, and that the elements of
one system can be translated into those of other systems are not
conclusive reasons for accepting the conclusion that paintings do not
have vocabulary.31 It has not been shown on their behalf that
analogous operations are impossible with respect to paintings. The
vocabulary elements in a language have fixed meanings, if at all, only
with respect to their membership in a sign scheme in which they are
assigned certain meanings. A dictionary will show that the same term
is usually assigned a range of meanings rather than a fixed meaning
and that the same word may be assigned quite different meanings.
Thus, if Langer's argument is that elements in paintings differ because
they do not have fixed meanings, etc., her argument could as easily be
applied to written verbal languages.
More important, it is not necessary that elements in painting
parallel in every way linguistic elements in order to say that paintings
may have vocabulary. Styles of painting are an alternative kind of
symbolic system with their own sense of vocabulary. This essay
suggests that phonemes, morphemes, and words are the vocabulary
elements in languages and that in styles of painting shapes are the
basic vocabulary elements. Are there, then, important analogies
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between vocabulary in language and in painting? There are two
important parallels. First, elements in both are used in combination
with other similar elements to form more complex "units of meaning."
Phonomes, morphemes, and words combine into sentences,
paragraphs, poems, etc. By analogy, shapes combine into whole
paintings or integrated sections of them. Second, a selection of both
elements, linguistic elements and shapes, are used as representational
vehicles in their respective schemes.
Alternative to Langer's view that painting has no vocabulary, I
have proposed that styles of painting have dominant vocabularies of
shapes. Elsewhere, a detailed analysis of vocabularies of shapes in
terms of three-shape types-motif, theme, and plastic-is presented.32
Motif shapes are configurations of pictorial elements identified with our
visual experiences of objects or events more or less familiar from
every day experiences. Geometric shapes and shapes associated with
human figures, buildings, trees, animal figures, etc., are examples of
motif shapes. Theme shapes are motif shapes which have the
additional feature of being associated with classical, biblical, or
historical myths, characters, and stories. When a shape is associated
with a theme, the shape carries with it the additional meaning
attached to the theme in its literary or historical setting. For example,
the human figure shapes in Da Vinci's The Last Supper do not merely
depict a group of men sitting at a table. Rather, these shapes are
understood by an informed viewer in relation to the biblical "last
supper" narrative. Plastic shapes are the vocabularies in "abstract
styles." Because they refer to abstract metaphysical notions, emotional
states, or unfamiliar nature phenomena, plastic shapes are not seen as
representational shapes in the sense of motif and theme shapes. They
are used by painters such as Mondrian and Rothko to represent
metaphysical realities and emotional states for which familiar visual
associations are not readily available.33
The three-shape categories share with words two proposed
features of vocabulary: the shapes combine into more complex units in
their respective systems. Also, they refer both generally-as when they
depict metaphysical notions and emotional states shared by many
persons or when they designate a human being but no single person-
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and specifically-as when a painting depicts a particular building or
person.

5. The Argument That Paintings Lack Syntax
Finally, I examine Langer's claim that paintings lack syntax.
Langer holds, and I agree, that syntax provides the rules in a sign
system for combining formal elements into composite units.34 The
more complete statement of her arguments against syntax of painting
occurs in her book, Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling. In Mind, the
essence of her objection to the use of syntax to speak of paintings is:
whereas the rules for combining elements in languages are "few
enough to be formally known as rules of syntax," the rules of painting
are not so few;35 whereas conventions change less frequently in word
usage, they change with greater frequency in painting; whereas the
conventions are more binding in word usage, they are less so in
painting; and whereas the manipulation of elements in a language
according to syntactic rules will produce a sentence, etc., the
manipulation of the elements of painting by rules will not result in a
work of art.36
None of these arguments offer serious substance to Langer's
contention that paintings lack syntax altogether. Her reasons for
denying syntax to painting make the criteria for deciding whether or
not a given schema has a syntax a matter of the degree to which it
possesses the stated properties. The absurdity of this becomes
apparent when we see what follows from it. If the criteria are as
Langer's view implies, the following questions are entitled to an
answer. How few rules must a schema have to be syntactic? How
much change in the conventions is permitted? How binding shall be
the conventions? To answer these questions requires both means for
measuring and norms for determining whether a given schema
qualifies, and these are not provided. It hardly seems fair to
presuppose, as Langer must, that written language, which is only one
kind of sign schema, should be taken as the norm.
This is not the only objection to Langer's arguments.
Particularly, the first three arguments commit the same kind of error
that appears in her discussion of vocabulary: failure to establish
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corresponding units of comparison between the schema of language
and of paintings. If we are comparing the syntactic rules of "all
paintings" with those of "a single language," then of course, the rules
for painting will be greater in number, the conventions will appear to
change more frequently, and the conventions will appear to be less
binding. This is because the comparison of an hypothetical schema
encompassing all of the schemata of painting with the schema of a
single language does not compare units of the same magnitude.
Without the determination of appropriate schemata for comparison,
Langer's discussion turns out to be relatively inconsequential in the
determination of whether or not paintings can be said to have syntax.
Langer's final argument offered against the possibility of syntax
for paintings is that manipulation of line, color, and the other pictorial
elements by rules will not produce "a work of art." This argument begs
the question. For the issue of syntax or none in paintings is not
whether the manipulation of lines and colors according to rule will
produce "a work of art." Rather it is, will the manipulation of these
elements according to rules be a dominant factor in producing a
painting in a certain style? As they are analyzed in this essay, rules of
style are indeed useful in making or analyzing a painting.
Alternative to Langer, I contend grammar-like rules of styles in
important respects analogous to syntactic rules of language. Both
determine formal arrangements of elements in the structures of their
respective units. Also, both provide criteria for distinguishing
acceptable from non-acceptable units of their systems. For example,
the expression "He worded the sentence incorrectly" is accepted as a
syntactically correct sentence. However, when judged by the rules of
English syntax, the expression "The incorrectly he sentence worded,"
using the same string of words, is syntactically incorrect. By analogy,
stylistic rules distinguish acceptable arrangements of shapes in the
works of a style. A comparison of Piero della Francesca's The
Flagellation and Hogarth's Satire on False Perspective with respect to
the rules of artificial linear perspective as used in Piero's style
illustrates how a painting may satisfy or violate the syntactic rules of a
style.37
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The syntactic rules for styles of painting differ in important
respects from both rules of logical syntax and syntactic rules of
grammar. Syntactic rules in logical systems describe proper sequences
of predicates, etc., and prescribe appropriate transformations,
substitutions, and deductions. Syntactic rules of ordinary languages
(English, French, etc.) characterize such arrangements as appropriate
sequences of subject-object-verb order. The rules of syntax in a style
of painting are based on stylistic practices for arranging shapes. Two
dominant factors in the structural arrangement of shapes in a
composition are color and linear spatial relations. Accordingly, the
rules of color arrangement and of linear spatial arrangement are two
dominant kinds of syntactic rules. Examples of color rules are: the use
of color zones (light, middle, dark) to order shapes in certain
Florentine paintings, the system of short daubs of energized color
characteristics of Impressionist paintings, and the juxtaposition of
"pure color shapes" against pure color shapes in Fauvist style.
Examples of different stylistic rules based on linear spatial
arrangement are found in the rules of artificial linear perspective use in
Piero's Renaissance style, the use of the "serpentive line" principle in
Mannerist style, and the principle of standardized units used in the
works of the painter Lohse.38 The rules of syntax cited in these
examples describe or prescribe in part the compositional arrangement
of shape elements in a style.
In conclusion, Hofstadter limits unjustifiably the sense of
referential meaning by arguing that it does not include, or is
incompatible with, other kinds of meaning. Langer errs in excluding
any referential function from the formative role of paintings. Her
contention that paintings belong to presentational rather than to
discursive schemata is ambiguous and is incongruous with studies
related to eye movement. By failing to specify appropriate criteria of
comparison, by limitation of such terms as vocabulary and work of art,
and by vague qualifications for syntax, Langer fails to render adequate
support to her contention that paintings lack vocabulary and syntax.
Consequently, Hofstadter's and Langer's arguments fail to show either
that schemata of paintings lack the features of semiotic schemes or
that referential (representational) meaning and function are
inappropriately applied to paintings. Finally, I conclude on the basis of
the proposals offered here that the notions of syntax and semantic find

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol 32, No. 3 (Spring 1974): pg. 331-342. DOI. This article is © Wiley and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

19

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

a place in the analysis of styles of painting which is both loosely
analogous to their use as applied to language and also distinct.39
The linguistic model operative in this analysis is the semiotic model as
proposed by Charles W. Morris, "Foundations of the Theory of Signs,"
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 1 (Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1938).
2
H. L. C. Jaffe, Syntactic Structure in the Visual Arts, ed. Gyorgy Kepes (New
York: 1965), pp. 139 f.
3
Heinrich Wolfflin, Principles of Art History (New York: 1950), pp. 12 f.
4
Meyer Shapiro, "Style," in Melvin Rader, A Modern Book of Aesthetics (New
York: 1965).
5
James S. Ackerman, "A Theory of Style," JAAC 20 (1962), 229 f.
6
Charles W. Morris, "Esthetics and the Theory of Signs," Journal of Unified
Science 8 (1939): 137.
7
I have detailed an application of a linguistic model to painting in "Style,
Painting, and Language: A Study of Language-Like Features in
Painting," (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1971). University Microfilms,
Ann Arbor.
8
Albert Hofstadter, "Significance and Artistic Meaning," Art and Philosophy,
ed. Sidney Hook (New York Univ. Press, 1966), p. 91.
9
Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Harvard Univ. Press, 1963).
10
Monroe Beardsley, "The Limits of Critical Interpretation," Art and
Philosophy, pp. 62, 63. Significance theories assert that the work of
art is "always, in a broad sense, a sign or symbol of something; it
copies, or imitates, or represents, or expresses."
11
Hofstadter, p. 91.
12
Hofstadter, p. 92.
13
George Lansing Raymond, Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture as
Representative Arts (New York: 1909), p. 2.
14
J. Ridley Stroop, "Interference in Serial Verbal Reaction," Journal of
Experimental Psychology 18 (1935): 643-61.
15
Carter, "Style, Painting, and Language," chap. 4.
16
Susanne K. Langer, Problems of Art (New York: 1957), pp. 126-32. A
discrepancy in Langer's statement concerning whether or not works of
art are representational apparently reflects a change of mind between
Philosophy in a New Key (p. 95) and Problems of Art (p. 132). I will
assume that the passage in Problems of Art represents her more
recent view.
17
Ibid., p. 133.
18
Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 79-102. Here Langer uses symbol to
refer to works of art and reserves sign for discursive languages. In
1

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol 32, No. 3 (Spring 1974): pg. 331-342. DOI. This article is © Wiley and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

20

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Feeling and Form (New York: 1953), p. 26, she drops this distinction
and uses sign to refer to both, as I do in this essay.
19
Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, pp. 83-87.
20
Ibid., pp. 86, 87.
21
Ibid., pp. 93,94.
22
Ibid., p. 95. The idea that the arts have no basic vocabulary is also
expressed in Langer's latest book, Mind: An Essay on Human Feelings,
I (Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 90.
23
The Delacroix and Turner works are reproduced in Otto. G. Ocvirk, et al.,
Art Fundamentals (Dubuque, Iowa; 1968), pls. LV, LVI. The Cezanne
work is reproduced in Max Raphael, The Demands of Art (Princeton
Univ. Press, 1968), pl. I.
24
Everett McNear, "Some Thoughts about the Painter's Craft," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 15 (1959): 62.
25
It may be objected that in verbal languages there are "canonical" sequential
orders, whereas there are not in most styles of painting. While it is
true that there are dominant orders for subject, object, verb order,
etc., it is also true that most languages provide for some alternative
orders; see Joseph H. Greenberg, ed., Universals of Language (M.I.T.
Press, 1963), pp. 86 f.
In English it is customary to place the major focus at the beginning
of a sentence, the minor focus at the end, and the least important
element in the middle. However, within limits the writer is free to
select which element is placed in these relative positions of emphasis.
Furthermore, he may for a reason choose to alter the order and place
the most important element at the end. The above considerations
suggest that the application of "canonical" to the sequential order of
elements in languages may be too strong. But it is probably correct to
say that sequential composition is less free in most languages than in
most styles of painting. As a result it is also likely that sequential order
in a style of painting, more so than its linguistic counterpart, is
reconstitutive or interpretive sequential order rather than a
compositional order.
26
When I define perception in terms of eye movement I am referring only to a
certain aspect of the operations of the eye as an initial stage of the
complicated process of perception. This presupposes that eye
movements are symptoms of an aspect of the perceptual process.
27
Guy Thomas Buswell, How People Look at Pictures (Univ. of Chicago Press,
1935), p. 16.
28
Ibid., pp. 142-43; see also Norman H. Mackworth and Jane Millikan,
"Factors Determining the Visual Selection of Information Within
Pictures," Psychonomic Bulletin 1 (1967): 9.
29
E. H. Gombrich, Meditations on a Hobby (London: 1965), pp. 115, 159.

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol 32, No. 3 (Spring 1974): pg. 331-342. DOI. This article is © Wiley and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

21

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 95.
Current dictionary usage clearly recognizes use of vocabulary to refer to the
elements a formal medium of artistic creation. See Webster’s Third
International Dictionary (Springfield, 1968), p. 2560.
32
Carter, "Style, Painting, and Language," chap. 4.
33
Herschel B. Chipp, Theories of Modern Art (Univ. of California Press, 1968),
pp. 332, 550.
34
Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 94.
35
Langer, Mind, I, p. 102.
36
Ibid., p. 90.
37
Carter, "Style, Painting and Language," chap. 5.
38
Charles Bouleau, The Painter's Secret Geometry (New York: 1963); see also
Richard P. Lohse, "Standard, Series, Module," in Module, Proportion,
Symmetry, Rhythm, ed. Gyorgy Keyes (New York: 1966.
39
Professors Marx W. Wartofsky and James Hullet of Boston University offered
helpful criticisms of a previous draft of the paper. Professors Paton
Ryan and Denis Savage of Marquette University gave valuable editing
suggestions.
30
31

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol 32, No. 3 (Spring 1974): pg. 331-342. DOI. This article is © Wiley and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley.

22

